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The politics of anti-racism in Belgium
A qualitative analysis of the discourse of the anti-racist
movement Hand in Hand in the 1990s
ANJA DETANT
Free University, Brussels (VUB)
ABSTRACT In the present environment of advanced industrial society and post-
war migration to Europe it is impossible to ignore the role of ideas about
immigration, national identity and ‘race’ in shaping social and political relations.
Although there is a public commitment in terms of official policies to the promotion
of anti-racism and a multicultural society, racist movements and ideas are increas-
ingly part of the public political debate. The question of what can be done to counter
the influence of racist ideologies and extreme right-wing political parties is at the
heart of contemporary concerns. Yet, there is considerable confusion of what is
meant by anti-racism and the policies and practices associated with it in different
national contexts. Moreover, there are a variety of theoretical approaches and
political perspectives about what kind of arguments and mobilizations are necessary
to curb the growth of racism. In Belgium, the anti-racist movement, Hand in Hand,
has developed a diverse range of strategies to answer the issue of everyday racism
and intolerance, to counter right-extremist ideas and to limit its political influence.
In this article, the focus will be on the political rhetoric developed by the anti-racist
movement in the 1990s, at the times of the national demonstrations against racism,
triggered by the electoral score of the extreme right-wing party, Vlaams Blok, in
1991. The results of a qualitative analysis of the information campaigns and media
coverage of the anti-racist demonstrations of 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2002 when
100,000 people marched in the streets of Brussels claiming equal rights and opposing
racism and discrimination, should offer insights into how the racialization of social
and political relations is shaped by both discourses on racism and anti-racism.
KEYWORDS antiracism ● multiculturalism ● racism ● right-extremism ● social
protest
A R T I C L E





In the last two decades, ‘race’ and racism have become a key issue in
political debates across Europe. New cultural and political spaces have
opened up and hegemonic national identities and structures have been
unchained. The shift of the terms around which national identities had
sedimented, the structural and cultural marginalization of migrant
communities, the rise and consolidation of right-extremism in several
countries (Belgium, France, Austria, Italy), and the lack of progress in
stemming the growth of racism, has set a difficult task to theories and prac-
tices of multiculturalism and anti-racism. Existing notions of national
identity, diversity, solidarity and social cohesion have been challenged and
appear as core elements of contested political discourses and practices. Not
only this, there is also much debate within European democratic societies
about the way that cultural differences may be negotiated and transcended
politically (Werbner, 1997: 261). There are no clear answers available to the
question as to what measures are necessary to tackle forms of discrimi-
nation and exclusion suffered by racialized minority communities.
Additionally, there is an ongoing debate across Europe about the need for
common anti-discrimination policies (Solomos and Back, 1996: 77; Anthias
and Lloyd, 2002: 19).
As racist movements and new forms of racism and xenophobia have
become increasingly part of a globalizing society, it is impossible to ignore
the role of ideas about immigration, ‘race’ and identity in shaping social and
political relations. At the same time, official and popular views about
immigration, national identity and racism have also been structured by
contemporary discourses of anti-racism and multiculturalism (Solomos and
Back, 1996: 104). From different ideological perspectives, the immigration
issue has become a symbol for basic values to be defended and political
options to be taken. The immigrant theme can be considered as a trigger to
the broader question of what society should look like. In a time and space
haunted by the problems of immigration and integration, insight into the
interpretative frames offered by discourses of racism and anti-racism are
therefore important (Solomos and Back, 1996: Chapter 5). An adequate
analysis of the racist phenomenon by anti-racist movements seems a
precondition to develop efficient counter-strategies and propose concrete
solutions. In other words, one needs to identify the range of social practices
that could be defined as racism, and that have to be tackled accordingly
(Anthias and Lloyd, 2002: 8).
The changing morphology of racial ideas and practices in western
societies urges for new ways of thinking about anti-racism that can provide
more efficient tools for anti-racist political practice.1 Across Europe we
have seen the rise of a diverse body of ideas, social movements and organiz-
ations that project themselves as anti-racist (Solomos and Back, 1996; Rea,
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1998; Anthias and Lloyd, 2002). It is clear that there is no shared notion of
what is meant by anti-racism or by the concepts of equality and multicultural-
ism, either at the level of ideology or political practice (Solomos and Back,
1996: 104). Anti-racism and multiculturalism are ‘contested frames of
reference for thinking about the quotidian cohesion of western civil
societies uncertain about their national and ethnic features’ (Hesse, 2000: 1).
Different forms of anti-racism often operate with different definitions of
what racism is (Bonnett, 2000: 4) and reflect the ambivalent field in which
anti-racism is situated, caught between universalism and particularism
(Wieviorka, 1998; Lloyd, 2002: 69). Clearly, there is much confusion about
the objectives of public policy and practices against discrimination at
different moments and in different contexts. Often anti-racism is formulated
as a negative category, defined in opposition to racism (Bonnett: 2000: 4).
Controversy about the valorization of cultural differences and the concep-
tual status of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ is central in debates on anti-racism and
multiculturalism. However, anti-racism is more than a response to racism; it
is a social force that has a positive dynamic of its own (Lloyd, 1998: 2, 29).
Anthias and Lloyd suggest that ‘anti-racism constitutes a set of polycentric,
overlapping discourses and practices which combine a response to racism(s)
with the construction of a positive project about the kind of society in which
people can live together in harmony and mutual respect’ (2002: 16).
The different approaches to anti-racism in Europe – in terms of the
mobilizing potential of ideas and values and the strategic aspects of the
political practices linked to it – indicate that anti-racism is a multifaceted
and contingent social force (Lloyd, 2002: 76). Discussing models of anti-
racism or ‘national traditions of anti-racism’ is a hazardous undertaking
(Bonnett, 2000: 53). Anti-racist movements not only diverge on a rhetori-
cal level – which can in large be linked to a particular political culture and
climate in which they develop. They also differ in their degree of organiz-
ation, their capability to create alliances, the possibilities to provide a
coherent and mass basis of political mobilization against racism, their role
and effectiveness as a pressure group and their relationship with policy-
makers. Moreover, anti-racism operates in a wide arena through public
policy and legislation, within institutionalized structures, in civil society and
social movements (Lloyd, 2002: 61).
In order to understand what exactly it is one fights for in multicultural
and/or anti-racist politics (Cohen, 1992: 62), one needs to situate these
projects in their specific historical and political context and link anti-racism
to the wider debates about the nature of democracy and society. The follow-
ing is an attempt to contribute to such an exercise. The article offers a study
of some of the core ideas on anti-racism that operated in the political
context of Flanders in the 1990s. It investigates the discourses of the alliance
between anti-racist associations, trade unions and other social movements
within the Hand in Hand (HiH) network and studies how anti-racism was
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linked to wider debates on discrimination, equality and social cohesion. The
primary focus is the relationship between public discourses on racism and
the rhetoric developed by HiH at the times of the mass demonstrations. The
analysis should offer insight into the ideological foundations of the anti-
racist movement and reveal how notions of racism and multiculturalism are
constructed throughout the anti-racist discourse. What is meant by the
notion of anti-racism? What kind of discourses does the anti-racist
movement employ? What are the political slogans and claims made in the
name of the anti-racist movement? Which are the key notions and policy
objectives proposed? What is the political agenda articulated around the
label of anti-racism? In other words, how has the HiH movement tried to
popularize anti-racist ideas to audiences that might in one way or another
be attracted to racist ideas and attempted to establish a mass basis of
political mobilization against racism?
The article is neither offering explanations for racism, nor solutions to
combat the phenomenon. Moreover, other social movements that were/are
active on the anti-racist front remain beyond our focus. Neither will we pay
attention to the anti-racism developed within the arena of public insti-
tutions.2 Despite these limitations, the article offers a detailed, empirically
grounded study of one of the main anti-racist organizations in Flanders and
tries to highlight the difficulties of the alliance in formulating a precise,
political anti-racist message. As such, the following is an attempt to
contribute to a better understanding of the features of anti-racism in a
particular place and time.
RACISM AND CRISIS: AT TEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE
SUCCESS OF RIGHT-EXTREMISM
The parliamentary elections on 24 November 1991 caused a political shock
in democratic Belgium. With more than 10 percent of the votes, the extreme
right-wing party Vlaams Blok proved to be able to gain substantial support
among the Flemish electorate for its racist, radically Flemish nationalist and
anti-democratic programme. The right-extremist party articulated feelings
of insecurity, and exploited the presence of non-European immigrants, to
warn against the destabilization of cultural values, and fulminated against
the socioeconomic competition between Belgium’s ‘own’ and the foreign
population. Vlaams Blok in particular envisaged the presence of Turkish
and Moroccan immigrants and their children as a problem. In the social
construction of the ‘immigrant problem’ the issue was reduced to a problem
with Muslims. Furthermore, the party set out the mental frame and turned
the ‘immigrant issue’ into a major problem in society (Billiet and De Witte,
1995; Swyngedouw et al., 1998). Vlaams Blok successfully promoted a
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programme based on ultra-conservative, authoritarian and antidemocratic
principles. It situated Flanders on the map of political racism that appeared
in the 1980s and confronted European democracies with their own
ambiguities and structural inequalities.
The steady progress of Vlaams Blok and important concentrations of
votes in certain areas such as the city of Antwerp, highlighted that the
everyday racism in society had found a political translation, which would
haunt traditional politics in Belgium throughout the 1990s.3 Subsequent to
the success of Vlaams Blok, an active debate in politics and public opinion
emerged. The causes and consequences of the appeal of right-extremist
ideas were the subject of the debate. Equally, the discussion concerned the
possible strategies to defy the right-extremist party. In addition, the issue
of integration became a key matter on the agenda. The discourse of
integration included multiple objectives: to limit the electoral rise of
Vlaams Blok, to remedy the marginal position of the immigrant population
and to resolve the negative feelings that seemed to push parts of the
Flemish electorate to vote for the right-extremist party (Deslé, 1997).
Since the electoral success of Vlaams Blok went along with a question-
ing of the legitimacy of traditional politics, insight into the causes for its
success appeared to be urgent. A diverse range of explanations has been
suggested, pointing to socioeconomic factors, political reasons and
sociopsychological motives, for example: the economic recession; the need
for flexibility and the restructuring of the job market; the dualization of
society and the marginalization of parts of the population; a foreign
presence that stimulated feelings of competition for social goods; the
inefficiency of the political system and the dysfunctions of democracy; the
loss of traditional social and political networks; secularization; the crisis of
the national welfare state in a context of European integration and globaliz-
ation; the search for order and security; the protest of the most vulnerable
parts of the population against a system that seemed to abandon them; the
sensationalism of the media in their coverage of the immigrant issue
(Piryns, 1992).4 Moreover, the extreme-right ideology seemed to flourish in
an atmosphere of crisis and political scandals in Belgium that stimulated a
climate of anti-political feelings and attitudes.
All these explanations are grounded in the idea that right-extremism and
racism are phenomena linked to a society in crisis. However, such accounts
have reduced these realities to their most observable aspects and seem to
neglect the complexity of it. Racism has been narrowed down to one of its
most apparent faces: the (verbal and electoral) expression of negative
feelings about ‘the other’. What is more, the crisis-racism link is presented
as a quasi-automatic one (Doom, 1992).5 Clearly, such an interpretation
allows associating racism and racist feelings with vulnerable individuals
who seem to state their frustration and fear in irrational and extreme
behaviour. A question that has not been resolved in this analysis is why
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feelings of insecurity are expressed in xenophobic attitudes against well-
defined ‘others’ (Deslé, 1992). Moreover, it remains unclear how
conventional ideas about citizenship, (national) identity and participation
have played a part in xenophobic and racist tendencies.6
Also, the racism-crisis link allows one to locate the phenomenon outside
‘normal’ political business. Consequently, racism seems to have entered the
political arena due to a manipulation of xenophobic and ethnocentric
feelings of parts of the population by Vlaams Blok. The party is identified
as the ultimate and the only responsible party for the political success of
racist ideas and propositions (Deslé, 1992). This has never prevented the
democratic political parties, however, from turning the presence of
immigrants in society into a major problem; allowing them to question their
‘ability’ to integrate, to deny these populations (up until the 1970s, non-
nationals in general, after that, more noticeably, non-Europeans) equal
positions in society and equal political rights, and to imply repressive
measures in order to address these concerns (Blommaert and Verschueren,
1998; Martens and Caestecker, 2001).
It seems that the (partial) explanations that have been presented have
the advantage of offering quite evident solutions to the so-called causes of
racism and to remedy its electoral consequences: developing a more
efficient policy against socioeconomic dualization, strengthening the link
between politics and civil society, reinforcing the role of social and political
networks, acquiring more transparency in the decision-making process,
investing in security, etc. None of these options is directly linked to the
phenomenon of racism and to the particular ways in which a general
dissatisfaction, on which it would be grounded, has been expressed (Deslé,
1992). One can doubt the adequacy of the proposed solutions to stop the
rise of right-extremism and the popularity of racist ideas. The setting in
which extreme right answers develop, the growing legitimacy of certain of
its ideas and the difficulty of defining and distinguishing racism in all its
forms and expressions, seem to explain the problem of developing efficient
democratic remedies. As more electoral successes for Vlaams Blok have
followed, the question of what can be done to counter the influence of racist
ideologies and extreme right-wing political parties is still at the heart of
contemporary concerns (Van Donselaer, 1995).
ANTI-RACISM AS A RESPONSE TO THE ELECTORAL
SUCCESS OF RIGHT-EXTREMIST IDEAS
Since 1991, democratic forces and social organizations in Flanders have
searched for answers and experimented with different approaches to the
message of the extreme right-wing party and have tried to find ways of
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countering the motives and xenophobic feelings of its electorate. A multi-
tude of anti-racist initiatives have been undertaken, mostly on a local level,
as an answer to the electoral success of right-extremism. On the national
level, several new social movements were born out of the first ‘Black
Sunday’ – as the electoral breakthrough of Vlaams Blok was called – Charta
91, Objectief 479.917 and HiH. These have obtained an important place in
the public debate.7 HiH and its francophone counterpart, Avec Vous, were
launched as a broad initiative of mass mobilization and of sensitizing
actions, and developed out of the collaboration between trade unions,
youth associations, migrant associations, the peace and third-world move-
ments. The latter network became the most popular and most mediatized
initiative in terms of anti-racism in Flanders.
The HiH network has developed a diverse range of strategies to answer
the issue of everyday racism and intolerance, to counter right-extremist
ideas and to limit their political influence.8 First of all, the initiatives of mass
mobilization were meant to sensitize and influence public opinion with
regard to the immigration issue. They were considered as a means to affirm
‘the limits of democratic tolerance’. Second, the HIH coalition aimed to
reinforce civil society and develop an anti-racist dynamic on a local level.
Third, the anti-racist movement wanted to pressure political actors in order
to influence the policy on socioeconomic integration, political participation
and international immigration. Finally, the HiH movement engaged in a
political struggle against Vlaams Blok, supporting the ‘cordon sanitaire’
strategy of confrontation and political isolation.9
In the sections that follow, the results of a qualitative analysis of the
information and mobilization campaigns and media coverage of the HiH
demonstrations are presented. The purpose of the analysis is a modest one:
to offer a critical reflection on the social construction of racism and cultural
diversity in the anti-racist discourse of HiH. I hereby build on the under-
standing of racism and anti-racism as discourses or interpretative frames,
which allow us to make sense of and evaluate the social reality and define
our position within it (Van Dijk, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Inter-
pretative frames are a set of commonsense concepts and notions that are
used to define reality, which orient our perspective, and trace the limits in
which social positions and relationships develop and are judged. In other
words, these discourses produce particular representations of reality and
generate particular, historically grounded and dynamic constructions of
social identities and social relations in society (Fairclough, 1993; Torfing,
1999).
Insight into the ideological message of the anti-racist network is offered,
based on an interpretive study of the HiH platform texts and information
campaigns at times of the mass mobilizations of March 1992, 1994, 1998 and
2002 – when 100,000 people marched in the streets of Brussels claiming
equal rights and opposing racism and discrimination. Before going into this,
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I examine the option taken by the HiH coalition in favour of mass demon-
strations as a means to provide a mass basis of political support against
racism. Then, for each instance, the demands of the network will be
described: what are the main points in its analysis, what are the values and
the worldview defended by the HiH anti-racist network? How is the anti-
racist message translated to public opinion and how can changes in focus
points be explained? Finally I comment on the specificity of the case and
conclude by evaluating the possibilities and limits of anti-racism as a
political ideology and as a set of policy objectives.
HAND IN HAND AND THE DISCOURSE OF ANTI-RACISM
One of the most remarked activities of the HiH anti-racist movement is the
mobilization of public opinion in mass demonstrations. The anti-racist
mobilizations of the 1990s can be seen as a product of a particular climate.
HiH started as an initiative taken up in December 1991 by a broad range
of associations that launched the proposition of organizing popular protest
within their ranks.10 By mobilizing public opinion, the HiH network aimed
to stimulate a vigilant counter-discourse to racism and right-extremism in
Belgian society. The purpose after the 1991 elections was to present a
powerful signal of ‘concerned citizens’ towards the political actors, focused
on two axes: democracy and tolerance. As I will show, these axes have
determined the actions of HiH throughout the 1990s and have been made
concrete in more or (often) less explicitly formulated political demands.
One of the main preoccupations was to reinforce democracy by promoting
the basic values of solidarity, equality and tolerance among public opinion.
A wide variety of instruments has been used to bring the messages of the
movement to the public: advertising in newspapers and magazines, tele-
vision and radio spots on public and commercial broadcasting channels,
information spots in cinemas, the development of flyers and posters, street
advertising, press conferences, etc. In every campaign, the anti-racist
movement used media personalities to bring its message out into the open.
The movement also invested in professional campaigns that played on the
emotional register to denounce intolerance and racism. The anti-racist
message was thus backed up by an attractive, popular and famous voice,
declaring its support and reinforcing the legitimacy of anti-racist actions.
Though not much information is available on the impact of the media-
campaigns, the use of personalities is an eye catcher and made it easier to
pass the HiH message through to these layers of the population that have
no particular strong opinion about the whole issue of immigrants, racism
and extreme right politics. It is these broad layers of the population that are
the target population for the anti-racist movement. Besides those factions
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that already support the anti-racist objectives and are engaged in the
movement, the group of undecided people might be convinced by the
message and should be motivated to sustain the popular front against
extremism.
Informing, sensitizing and marching along in big numbers are believed
to be effective instruments in the struggle against everyday racism and
racist stereotypes. First, the strategy is seen as an expression of the norma-
tive choices of society. It is a way to make clear that racist claims and acts
are rejected by public opinion. The anti-racist coalition was convinced that
the mobilization of important numbers of citizens would prove that the
extreme right-wing parties are not the ‘spokespersons’ for the ‘silent
majority’ in the population, as they often claim to be. On the contrary, mass
mobilization would show that large parts of the population refuse extrem-
ism and racism. Second, such demonstrations are seen as a confirmation of
the basic principles of democracy, solidarity and tolerance. As such, they
contribute to an environment where racism and discrimination are rejected.
Third, mass demonstrations are considered as a means to put pressure on
the political decision makers. The pressure becomes more important as
more people are prepared to participate. Also, the political significance
amplifies when a diverse range of influential associations and pressure
groups are mobilizing support for a clearly defined manifesto of demands
and claims.
The 1992 demonstration
Massive mobilization When HiH came into being in December 1991, it
first of all wanted to be an emotional reaction of civil society to the elec-
toral success of Vlaams Blok. As mentioned, a diverse range of social move-
ments agreed to invest in a large-scale demonstration and called their
members and supporters to mass mobilization. For HiH, the real strength
of the action was to prove that many ‘ordinary citizens’ were prepared to
engage in the struggle for a stronger democracy.
At the first HiH demonstration on 22 March 1992 between 120,000 and
150,000 people were mobilized by the participating organizations of trade
unions, youth associations, the peace and third world movement, migrant
associations, etc. The demonstration was presented as a celebration of
democracy and tolerance, a colourful gathering and a testimony to the
diversity in society.11 Besides the massive presence of ordinary citizens, the
plural composition of the anti-racist movement has been put to the fore as
an element of strength. The national character of the mobilization was
another important factor – especially in the context of the federal state,
haunted by ‘communautarian frictions’ between Flemish and francophones.12
One believed that the dynamic of an extensive coalition would prove the
large support of the anti-racist message within the population. Clearly the
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‘argumentation of numbers’ allowed the anti-racist movement to demon-
strate its vigilance and to confirm the legitimacy of its ideology in the
confrontation with racist and anti-democratic forces in society.
The climate of anti-politics in which racism and right-extremism seemed
to be grounded explains why the anti-racist movement distanced itself from
the established political system and its actors. Considerable efforts were
made to present the HiH message as a manifesto of the people. HiH
insisted on being a social organization, a movement of citizens, a social
force that had to be situated outside politics. In its communication strategy,
the HiH network promoted the profile of being a popular, pluralist and
broad movement of ordinary citizens. As such, it wanted to take up the
tasks of launching political signals, confirming basic values in society, acting
as a voice of many citizens and presenting a counter-discourse to right-
extremist tendencies. In the next section I will explore the basic elements
of the anti-racist discourse, as this developed subsequent to the 1991
political shock.
In favour of a new political culture The platform text of March 1992
was more a statement of principles than a bundle of concrete political
demands. The official message of the demonstration can be classified as a
triple one: a statement in favour of democracy, a plea for tolerance, and a
reaffirmation of the principle of solidarity. The basic values of a democratic
society were confirmed without, however, offering a precise answer as to
what these really mean in a changing and multicultural society, where some
people are categorized as non-citizens and legally treated as different.
Instead, the anti-racist network concentrated on formulating answers to a
particular climate in society that seems to push parts of the population to
racist attitudes and that makes people vulnerable to a manipulation by
right-extremist groups. It offered an analysis of the causes and problems
that had (not so suddenly) come to the fore. The anti-racist movement
hereby mainly reproduced a dominant and one-dimensional approach to
racism and its causes.
The problem of everyday racism was not explicitly mentioned. The
concept of racism even seemed a taboo word. The term was barred in order
not to disturb public opinion. Instead, ‘intolerance’ and ‘insecurity’, the
terms used to highlight the problem, were defined as core matters. These
were considered as the consequences of a failing policy and a weakened
democratic system. Next, the ‘immigrant issue’ and the problem of inter-
national immigration were explained as part of a much broader problem of
inequality. Consequently, the analyses of the anti-racist movement focused
on the need for another way of governing. The coalition demanded a
different policy on social issues, welfare, immigration and international
cooperation.
As an answer to extremism, the anti-racist network claimed a radical new
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way of ‘doing politics’. Both the style and the content of Belgian politics
needed revision. A new political culture had to be characterized by
efficiency and transparency. It implied new structures, new priorities, a
more democratic functioning of society on all levels and in all aspects of
life. The political system had to become one in which everyone would be
involved and feel responsible. Therefore, politics needed to be less bureau-
cratic and complex, less abstract and more concerned with the ‘real needs’
and the everyday problems of the people.
The debate about what kind of alternative policy one wanted to fight for
resulted in a platform text that gave expression to the main sensibilities of
the anti-racist partners. The HiH message was first of all an attempt to
formulate an answer to the endeavours of the multicultural society – though
the concept was not explicitly used. In order to be able to deal with the
permanent presence of a migrant population, the anti-racist network
demanded a more human policy that would establish a more egalitarian,
more democratic and more tolerant society, both on a national and inter-
national level. Equal rights and equal chances, an equal access to major
domains in society, and mutual respect and openness towards differences
were identified as necessary requirements. The platform did not offer any
answers to the question of how to realize these objectives and made no clear
distinction between the political, structural expressions of racism and
individual attitudes. Vaguely formulated solutions on a political and
individual level were advanced.13 The platform text demanded a more
balanced distribution of welfare and equal access to education, jobs,
housing and social security. These were deemed necessary to resolve the
many problems of marginalization and deprivation that were indicated as
a cause of intolerance.
In other words, the anti-racist movement identified racism as the
problem of a deficient political system and a weak political culture. The
coalition thus accepted the dominant explanation: that of the existence of
an anti-political climate in which right-extremism could flourish. It recog-
nized the crisis–racism link as the dominant frame to understand the
negative and racist feelings for which right-extremist populists had found a
political translation. As a consequence, solutions were presented mainly in
terms of reinforcing social-economic policy and political efficiency. The
message implied the need for a ‘new political culture’ in which the citizen
would feel respected and engaged and where the gap between the political
elite and civil society would be resolved. From a more international
perspective, a different policy in matters of immigration was put on the
agenda and more investment was demanded in development policy and in
international welfare and peace. The general claim was thus one in favour
of a global politics against a dual society.
The continuous fight for more democracy and tolerance was expressed
as a concern of all citizens. Here, the main argument was the dependency
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and mutual interest of all in a solidarist and tolerant society. The population
was solicited to change its attitude and to be more tolerant. At the same
time, the anti-racist movement linked its call for tolerance to a message of
‘understanding’. The anti-racist movement argued the need to ‘compre-
hend’ that a general feeling of dissatisfaction made people more sensitive
to the populist discourse and the demagogy of the extreme right.14
However, the message affirmed that an attitude of egoism (‘Me first’) was
morally unacceptable and dangerous for society.
Furthermore, the HiH manifesto agreed that the tolerance that was
demanded of Belgium’s ‘own’ population needed to go together with ‘inte-
gration efforts’ by the migrant population. Integration is a typical political
concept in migration policy – which has been thoroughly questioned in
academic circles and which was fiercely rejected by members of the
concerned migrant communities.15 The concept of integration has a
problematic nature and one should definitely question its relevance as an
instrument in the struggle against racism (Talhaoui, 1997). However, the
anti-racist network advanced integration as a two-way track, a continuous
process of mutual understanding.
The anti-racist movement thus refrained from a critical approach to the
dominant frame of reference that constructs nationals and non-nationals as
oppositional categories. It is a discourse that produces ‘citizens’ and
‘foreigners’ and makes it difficult to counter the differential legal status,
rights and treatment that follow from this distinction. The anti-racist
network did not offer an alternative framework to deal with the changing
dynamics in society and to break out of the dominant, national and by
consequence homogeneistic interpretation of society (Blommaert, 1996).
Far from offering precise remedies and policy answers, the anti-racist
network identified major domains of action, listed under the key term of a
‘new political culture’. Hereby the network linked its struggle to the
deficiencies of modern democratic institutions. Obviously, it acted upon the
political sensitivity of the moment. In the 1990s, the idea of creating a new
political culture would be a true baseline in the discourse of the political
parties. These all tried to reform and reposition themselves in order to
‘reconnect’ to the civil society.
Anti-racism: Consensus and confusion The 1991 elections had a
remarkable effect on politics. The breakthrough of Vlaams Blok has led to
an explicit condemnation of racism by all traditional political parties. Many
politicians and all the democratic parties promoted anti-racism as a cause
for support. Yet the content and implications of an adherence to anti-racism
varied widely.16 Moreover, the government proclaimed anti-racism as one
of their objectives in order to solve the ‘migrant problem’. When HiH was
launched, the government explicitly declared its support for the anti-racist
network in its actions. At the same time, the government pointed to the
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responsibility of all ‘positive’ actors in society – employers, trade unions,
sociocultural associations and the whole of the population – to collaborate
and work together in a sphere of openness and tolerance. To succeed in
creating a more open and tolerant society, responsibility and burden
sharing thus seemed a prerequisite. The government declaration also
included a quite ambivalent message. The need to respect the law and to
accept that rights and duties are two sides of the same coin sounded as a
warning to the immigrant population, who claimed equal rights. No doubt,
the message was a way of comforting critical voices in regard to the equal
rights issue. Although 1991 stimulated a public commitment in terms of
official policies for the promotion of anti-racism and a multicultural society,
the political will to reduce structural inequalities and tackle racist practices
would in the following years prove to be quite limited (Martens and
Caestecker, 2001). This is not the only ambiguity that can be found in anti-
racist declarations.
One of the main ambivalences of political and social actors in develop-
ing an efficient strategy against racism in Belgium is due to the difficulty of
making a strong principled statement against it. The confusion about what
is exactly understood as racism, on which level the phenomenon is situated
and the discussion on what society can tolerate and accept, explains part of
this problem. In general, the issue is reduced to clear-cut forms and blatant
expressions of racism. It is interpreted as an exceptional thing, as a devi-
ation by extremist groups and powerless, frustrated individuals. How then
to reject racism and extremism without rejecting the feelings and opinions
of, or accusing, the people who feel attracted by (parts of) the anti-
immigrant message of the extreme right parties?
At the same time, there is no shared notion of what is meant by the
concept of a multicultural society. Not only is there no clear vision on how
to develop a political practice that articulates new ways of recognizing
cultural differences, neither is there a clear view on the consequences of
developing new conceptions of democracy, tolerance and solidarity.
Consequently, in order to attract as many people as possible for its actions,
the anti-racist network consciously opted for a general declaration of
principles instead of a more polarizing bundle of political demands. That
the official pamphlet of the HiH network remained rather general was
without any doubt also a necessary requirement to be able to quickly
mobilize the support of a diversity of associations and pressure groups in
both sides of the country (Flemish and francophone). The broad coalition
explains the need for compromise and for a discourse aiming at the largest
common denominator in the anti-racist struggle.
This contrasted with the statements made by the main participating
organizations in their own publications and in press articles produced
concerning the initiative. Obviously, the message towards their own specific
public was more concrete and contained a stronger political profile. The
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trade unions, for example, offered a more political analysis to explain the
climate of insecurity and intolerance. The unions referred to the historical
struggle of the labour class against the conservative world in order to obtain
democratic rights and social and economic security. They underlined the
importance of the continuous struggle of the workers in favour of a demo-
cratic system based on the principles of equality, solidarity, tolerance and
participation. Democracy was presented as a direct result of the workers’
struggle and the solidarity of the workers’ movement was identified as a
condition for social progress. In pointing to the causes for the actual crisis
and offering solutions, the ideological divergences between the unions
become more obvious.
The socialist trade union focused in particular on a critique of neo-
liberalism. The pressure on the democratic system and the problems of the
1990s were explained as a consequence of the neoliberal policy of the 1980s
that had encouraged a climate of egoism. This policy option had led to an
erosion of the role of the state, a shrinking investment in social welfare and
a climate in which economic benefit became an end in itself. The socialist
union claimed a radically new – and more socially inspired – policy, a
reinforcement of the role of the state and of the democratic principles to
counter the neoliberal climate in which extreme right tendencies could
flourish.
The Christian labour movement remained more vague and concentrated
on the analyses of a growing distance between the political world and the
wider population. The union insisted on its role as part of civil society. The
importance of social networks in creating and sustaining a sense of
community and participation has played a big part in the Christian union’s
discourse. It underlined its tradition to act against all forms of exclusion,
referred to its historical role in the social struggle and reinterpreted its basic
values (peace, tolerance, democracy, solidarity) in favour of a multicultural
society where ‘races do not divide us’. The Christian union, traditionally
strongly rooted in the catholic Flanders, even referred to openness as a
typical feature of the Flemish character that had to be defended. Contrary
to the analyses of its socialist counterpart, the Christian movement thus saw
a solution more in terms of strengthening the position of civil society and
stimulating the role of social movements.
Though all along the trade unions have been important actors in the anti-
racist coalition, they have in particular been confronted with the difficulty
of conveying principled statements of equal rights and solidarity with
immigrants without upsetting their affiliates. Though on an ideological level
the trade unions clearly reject every form of racism, intolerance and xeno-
phobia definitely reign in its ranks and seem to limit the possibilities of




Equal rights for all The 1991 HiH demonstration was first and foremost
a reaction to a political event – the electoral breakthrough of the extreme
right party. The mobilization of 1994 had a clearly different character from
the first demonstration. The mass demonstration aimed to reinforce the
democratic climate in preparation for the forthcoming elections. Also, the
action was more intended to be an instrument for lobbying and for trying
to influence the political decisions that were to be taken. HiH chose to
defend a more engaged platform text that included the demands for
political rights for foreigners, for concrete measures in terms of employ-
ment and a reinforcement of democracy.
The 1994 platform invited people to ‘choose for democracy and toler-
ance in their commune and in the whole of Europe’.17 This message insisted
on making a democratic choice in view of the upcoming local and European
elections. Moreover, it is interesting to see how the general motto of the
demonstration was adapted to the political sensitivities in the northern and
southern parts of the country. The francophone partners in the HiH
network made the strategic choice to march ‘In favour of a democracy
without exclusion’. The absence of a strong extreme-right actor in Wallonia,
the more republican/universal rhetoric towards foreigners and the poor
socioeconomic condition in the southern part of the country seemed to
influence this choice.
The slogans used reveal not only the political opportunities and concerns
of the moment, but also the preoccupation of the most influential actors in
the network. Though the principles stated during the first demonstration
were confirmed, a more concrete platform of demands was launched. To
start with, the issue of political rights for foreigners became a priority and
the platform text suggested some key measures to put into practice its basic
values. More democracy was first and foremost translated as equal rights
for everyone. In its analysis of what democracy signified, the anti-racist
movement linked poverty and economic and social marginalization to
political powerlessness. Claims for equal opportunities and equal chances
consequently referred to equal rights for everyone, including political rights
for foreigners. One believed that granting voting rights to foreigners would
confirm their presence as an equal part of the population. It would articu-
late their acceptance as citizens. The anti-racist movement inserted the
demand of political rights in a universalistic human rights approach, and
committed itself to a general rejection of any form of discrimination. Not
only the objective was framed in explicit terms; the anti-racist coalition also
agreed on the modalities to realize the claim: a residence of five years in
the country was proposed as a criterion to obtain political rights, including
the right to vote.18
The claim ‘Same duties, same rights’ positioned the anti-racist action in
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the middle of the ongoing political debate. The anti-racist movement made
its option clear: political rights needed to be based on citizenship instead of
nationality. The political actuality of the time served as an extra argument
in the debate. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 had already installed the
notion of European citizenship. As a consequence, all European residents
staying in one of the member states of the European Union would be
attributed voting rights in the European and local elections. Since political
rights were granted exclusively to people with a Belgian nationality, the
Belgian constitution needed to be changed in order to be able to apply this
rule. In view of the constitutional reform, the conditions that would be
attached to obtaining political rights were fiercely debated. On the one
hand, one could decide to grant voting rights to European citizens only. On
the other hand, one could open it up to all citizens (including non-
Europeans) on the basis of their residence period.
HiH used the network to set the issue of an ‘open constitutional reform’
on the political agenda. It was hoped that the popular mobilization would
be a means of pressurizing the political decision makers. Because the
demand for full equality between all inhabitants regardless of their nation-
ality was formulated in such precise terms, the anti-racist network received
considerable criticism. It lost the official support of most political
formations, except for the ecology parties, who were in favour of the
citizenship option. The political establishment insisted on the nationality
rule for non-Europeans to obtain political rights. However, within the
parties, voices were diverse and individual politicians did express their
opinion in favour of voting rights.
Also, the demand for ‘more democracy’ was made concrete in the claim
of ‘Jobs for everyone’. With this demand the trade unions put their mark
on the anti-racist message. The anti-racist discourse referred to the negative
tendencies of the 1980s: a dualization of society characterized by a growing
underclass of unemployed and excluded people. The structural unemploy-
ment and the liberal attacks on the system of social security and solidarity
were highlighted as causes of egoism, growing nationalism and racism.
Instead, the right to work and to have a secure income needed to be
guaranteed. Democracy, equality and tolerance thus required more state
regulation. State intervention was deemed necessary to counter the conse-
quences of industrial decline and of technological advancement. Moreover,
as an answer to the negative impact of a globalizing economy, a stronger
social policy was demanded, both on a national and on a European level.
From a broader perspective, the issue of tolerance also concerned the
rights of asylum seekers. Since other possibilities for legal immigration to
Belgium have been closed down since 1974, the asylum procedure had
become a prominent channel for immigration. A rise in the numbers of
asylum seekers made the issue visible on the political agenda of the 1990s
as a prominent political problem. Moreover, Vlaams Blok did not hesitate
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to profile itself on the asylum question. The concept of ‘asylum seeker’
acquired a mainly negative, fraudulent connotation in the public discourse.
The anti-racist movement hoped to correct the corrupted interpretation by
Vlaams Blok by framing the issue as a problem of unequal relations with
third-world countries, demanding respect for human rights and pointing to
the need to invest in development. The real problems, it was said, were a
failing policy and a climate of collective egoism that characterized the
western countries.
Lastly, the anti-racist network demanded more efficient legal means in
the struggle against racism and right-extremism. A strict application of the
legal instruments against racism was on the anti-racist agenda, as well as the
development of a code against discrimination in all sectors of society.
The platform text of 1994 clearly is much more political. The demands
put to the fore express a broader, structural view of the problems of a
society in which racism and right-extremism could grow and flourish.
Moreover, the problems of racism and political extremism were denounced
in a more explicit way than was the case in HiH’s first demonstration.
However, the association between socioeconomic insecurity, intolerance
and racism remained the core of the anti-racist analysis. The focus hereby
was mainly on clear-cut expressions of racism. The target of the anti-racist
struggle was thus the racism of Vlaams Blok. Anti-racism thereby focused
on those expressions of the phenomenon that clearly disturb commonsense
views of ‘our democratic society’. It is these extreme racisms that can be
labelled in terms of a disease, ‘a cancer that we must combat’. The mass
mobilization was thereby presented as just one stage on a long road of
struggle. This demonstration resembled the first one: a massive presence,
important delegations of youngsters and immigrants, a strong input by the
trade unions, the support of many and diverse pressure groups and a
positive response in the media.
Anti-racism: A long-term battle For the anti-racist network, the policy
question remained: how to go beyond defensive reactions and instant
messages of tolerance and solidarity? Did the country need a permanent
and pluralistic anti-racist movement? How could such a movement go
beyond symbolism and translate its demands into concrete political engage-
ment? Would it be more effective to insert anti-racist action as a core
business within the action-radius of existing social organizations and
pressure groups with a more militant and concrete political profile? The
choice to be made seemed, in other words, to be the following: continuing
a broad anti-racist coalition directed towards public opinion and focused on
strong symbolic actions or, developing a genuine anti-racist lobby that
could function as a political watchdog and effectively pressure the political
decision-making process.19
In the following years, the partners of the anti-racist coalition would act
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in a more dispersed way: local and smaller-scale demonstrations, petitions
and multicultural happenings, debates and concerts, media campaigns,
actions concerning the cordon sanitaire. The dynamism and coherence of
the movement seemed to be lost and the main partner associations became
sceptical towards the idea of mass mobilization. The risk of failure – in
terms of convincing important numbers of people or mobilizing only very
specific segments within the population – was not unthinkable. Failure
would signify the defeat of the progressive movements and prove the
weakness of the anti-racist coalition. Moreover, the demands of 1994 had
not found a translation into adequate political measures and the general
climate was one in favour of more conservative, right-wing ideas and policy
options. The efficiency of mass demonstrations was put into question and
it seemed that such actions were mainly ‘preaching to those already
convinced’.
1998: Dealing with a multicultural society
Following the above-mentioned hesitation and a period of immobility, the
youth movements and the Brussels’ anti-racist network, Brussels Gekleurd,
insisted on reactivating the anti-racist coalition. VAKA-Hand in Hand, the
trade unions, youth associations, Objectief, Charta and Brussels Gekleurd
agreed to organize a new national demonstration in March 1998. This time,
the anti-racist coalition would march under the umbrella of a new
temporary network called Initiatief. More than 100 organizations and
pressure groups finally subscribed to the platform in order to try once more
to influence the political agenda concerning voting rights for foreigners.
The problem of political rights had not been resolved. In order to settle the
issue for European citizens in relation to the Maastricht Treaty, it would be
forced onto the agenda of the government. ‘The right to vote’ was repeated
as the main demand of the platform. However, compared to the former
demonstration, the anti-racist coalition seemed unable to agree on concrete
strategies to obtain political participation and equality. The political climate
with regard to the immigrant issue was rather negative: anti-immigrant
feelings appeared to be strong, the Vlaams Blok had managed to determine
the political agenda on this issue, the government had been confronted with
the problem of rising numbers of asylum seekers and people without legal
papers staying in the country and most political formations opted for more
or less repressive options concerning the immigration issue.
In such a negative, xenophobic climate, it was a preoccupation of the
anti-racist coalition to make sure that the mass demonstration would be a
success in terms of numbers. The amount of public support that could be
mobilized would be used to measure the credibility of the anti-racist
movement. Obviously, the success of the demonstration depended on the
political significance of the organizations and pressure groups that adhered
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to it and on the number of citizens that would prove their loyalty to the
anti-racist message. A reasonable impact on the political decision-making
process could be expected if important numbers could be mobilized. Yet, a
more concrete bundle of demands would polarize public opinion. Further-
more, the network of social movements could not agree on minimal or
maximal positions concerning voting rights and disagreement also related
to the terms used to state certain issues. The option was thus one in favour
of pragmatism. As a consequence, the anti-racist movement deployed an
extremely vague argumentation and the manifesto of 1998 was little more
than a bundle of principal objectives over which there was a broad consen-
sus. The national demonstration against racism and discrimination of 1998
wanted ‘A voice, the right to vote’ (Une Voix, des Droits in the francophone
version). The slogans on the Flemish side demanded ‘Equal rights,
democracy and solidarity, no racism or discrimination’.
The anti-racist network reformulated the demands of 1994 to combat
racism and discrimination and to stimulate solidarity. Equality, fairness and
solidarity formed the core concepts in the demand for a better democracy.
The message included a plea to accept people as full citizens and to opt for
a politics of equal rights. How the concept of citizenship could be defined
and through which concrete political actions full citizenship would become
a reality remained open to interpretation.
Basically, the platform insisted on equal rights in terms of political
participation. The argumentation drew attention to the rights of all workers
in Belgium in the social elections.20 The anti-racist movement referred to
equality in the social elections as an example in the struggle in favour of
equal rights in the social, economic and political sphere. The impact of the
trade unions in reformulating this demand is without question. The trade
unions are among the more influential actors in the anti-racist coalition.
They have played an important role in the historical struggle for social
rights and have been defending political participation since the 1970s. It was
obvious that a non-attribution of voting rights to the many non-European
immigrants that had been living in the country for many years would – once
more – be a defeat of the principles of true democracy. Moreover, a
negative decision would install a hierarchy within the immigrant popu-
lation. One would distinguish European immigrants with political rights
from non-European immigrants without political rights.
The principle of equality in political matters was launched as an objec-
tive. Yet, in terms of strategy the platform text remained silent. This time,
the anti-racist network did not pronounce itself in favour of the residence
rule, or of the citizenship option. The network also remained silent on other
possibilities: a more easy attribution of the Belgian nationality as a pre-
condition for political rights and equal chances. The partner associations
were more precise in their demands, but the broad coalition left the
question ‘how to get there’ unspoken. This was a step backwards compared
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to the 1994 platform. Apparently the affiliating associations were hesitant
about the support of their members for a more pronounced objective. It is
not very clear in what way the rise of xenophobic tendencies – as expressed
in the electoral success of Vlaams Blok – had influenced the anti-racist
actors in this matter.
The lack of popular support is one of those tricky arguments, often
advanced by the political establishment in order to explain its reluctance to
open up the political field to non-nationals. The negative feelings of a part
of the population towards immigrants and the pressure of the political
extreme right seem to paralyse the established parties to push democratic
participation beyond the limits of the national framework. Even the
political participation of European citizens appeared to be problematic,
mainly because of communitarian arguments between Flemish and franco-
phones.21 The whole question had been delayed several times and both
voices in favour of and against opening up political rights – with or without
new limitations in terms of nationality – were formulated in the ranks of
the political establishment. In February 1998, the government finally took
the decision to change the constitution in order to allow European citizens
to participate in the communal elections in Belgium in 2000. This change
was obligatory in order to comply with the Maastricht Treaty, where the
principle in favour of political rights for citizens of the European member
states had been accepted (Foubert, 1998). Political rights for non-European
foreigners were postponed once again and a possible solution would not be
on the agenda before 2001. This would not allow political participation
before the local elections of 2006.
The political resistance to changing the conditions for obtaining political
rights has thus been a major one and the Belgian decision was a late one,
creating a duality between European and non-European citizens residing
in the country. An important opportunity was thus missed to make clear
that the members of the non-European immigrant population were
accepted as full citizens. Instead, the government had chosen to confirm
the legal division between locals and foreigners; the former including
Europeans, the latter referring to non-Europeans.
2002: Anti-racism from an international perspective
The core issues of democracy and equality have been on the agenda of the
anti-racist mobilization of March 2002. But the latest demonstration had its
own accents in response to actual developments. Behind the general slogan
of ‘equal chances to everyone’ one could read a clear message in favour of
a multicultural society. Never before has the anti-racist movement so
explicitly defended ‘multiculturalism’ as a reality which society simply has
to deal with. The changing character of society was defined as a challenge.
Not the issue of diversity, but discrimination and racism were identified as
ETHNICITIES 5(2)202
203
the real problems of democracy. It is these enemies of the democratic
system that needed to be fought by a politics of equal chances. The message
of equality indicated the main domains of action: equal rights and equal
chances were demanded in education, employment, and with regard to
political participation.
Except for the classical anti-racist demands, the platform stressed the
broader international context in which anti-racism needed to develop
further. A global perspective on the problem of immigration was used to
denounce the evolution towards a dual society, to talk of the problem of
international solidarity and to put the issue of unequal chances between
north and south on the agenda. Clearly, the European debate on asylum
policy and the option in favour of a more repressive politics in immigration
matters pushed the anti-racist movement to highlight the structural causes
for international migration. An answer to worldwide poverty, war, the
violation of human rights and other push factors to migration would include
measures such as fair trade, international cooperation, more investment in
development projects, an embargo on the trade of arms, a Tobin-tax, etc.
The anti-racist coalition hereby stressed the international roots of the whole
migration and asylum issue. Clearly, its analysis was strongly influenced by
the NGO-sector and the anti-globalist movement that had come to the fore.
At the same time, as an answer to racism and xenophobia, the coalition
launched a plea for a more humane approach towards asylum seekers and
immigrants on a national and European level.
In sum, the movement confirmed its core values but positioned itself less
fiercely in the struggle against racism, discrimination and right-extremism.
The core of the 2002 platform was the concept of equal chances and respect
for human rights, both on a national and an international level. However,
in respect of multiculturalism and equal chances in the country, the accents
on the Flemish and francophone sides differed thoroughly (Rea, 2000). On
the francophone side, the asylum issue got particular attention. Granting a
residence permit to people without legal papers was a principal demand, as
well as putting a stop to a politics of refoulement, that sent ‘illegals’ back
home. On the Flemish side, the main point of action concerned – once again
– the attribution of political rights for non-European foreigners. The anti-
racist coalition wanted to put pressure on the decision that would be taken
by Parliament on this account some days after the planned demonstration.
Though the issue had not been included in the government declaration, all
parties on the francophone side were in principle in favour of political rights
for non-European citizens, except the extreme right. The political resist-
ance to voting rights has been particularly strong in Flanders and the propo-
sitions of law on this account could not find a majority in the Parliament
because of the negative votes on the Flemish side.
The anti-racist network hoped nevertheless to influence the outcome of
the vote in the senate. The movement managed to get the support of some
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famous personalities for the action and succeeded in attracting a positive
response from several political parties (ecologists, socialists, francophone
Christian democrats and extreme left) towards its demands. In this crucial
political moment, the anti-racist network had well timed its action and once
more applied the strategy of being present in the media. Its message was
presented as one backed up by many ordinary citizens who believed in a
multicultural society. Though expectations were more limited, the demon-
stration brought 10,000 to 15,000 people to Brussels. In a difficult context
of conservatism and repressive ideas, this was considered a major success
and a strong signal towards the political establishment.
Nevertheless, the main demand of political participation was – once
more – not realized. Together with Vlaams Blok, the Flemish right-wing
liberal party – eventually supported by its French counterpart MR, who
agreed to vote against the bill – and the Flemish Christian democrats put a
veto on political participation on the basis of residence. The Flemish
opposition parties thereby used the argument that public opinion in
Flanders was not in favour of political rights for non-European foreigners.
Also, it was said that such a decision would reinforce the right-extremist
party. True, the electoral strength of Vlaams Blok has grown steadily and
the reservoir of racism and xenophobia seems stronger than one had
imagined. A negative attitude towards foreigners has appeared to be the
strongest motivation to vote for Vlaams Blok. Its political programme has
focused on anti-immigrant options and combined racism, nationalism, and
authoritarian points of view with a strong apolitical attitude. The aversion
to the political establishment and its identification as ‘the party of the
people’ seemed to make its success even stronger. It is, however, very
unlikely that giving in to this is a good option for fight racism and right-
extremism in Belgian society. One thing is sure, that it kept the foreign
population voiceless.22
A FUTURE FOR THE ANTI-RACIST MOVEMENT?
In the anti-political climate of the 1990s the anti-racist network has
presented itself as a broad, plural movement of concerned citizens. The
objective of the mass demonstrations was to inform, sensitize and mobilize
public opinion in the struggle against everyday racism; to create a counter-
movement and to offer an alternative discourse to the right-extremist
ideology. As I have shown, the question that constituted the core business
of anti-racist rhetoric was how to change a climate in society that would
push parts of the population to racist attitudes and make them vulnerable
to a manipulation by right-extremist groups. The anti-racist demands that
were communicated at the mass demonstrations of 1992, 1994, 1998 and
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2002 have shown a continuous preoccupation of the anti-racist network
with democracy and equality. Everyday racism and political extremism
have been presented as excesses of a system that needs to be defended. As
a consequence, the anti-racist struggle appeared in its essence to be a
struggle for the promotion of basic democratic values in society: solidarity,
equality and tolerance. However, how these principles can be put into
practice in the changed reality of a multicultural society that excludes part
of the population was not on the agenda of anti-racism. The anti-racist
message revealed itself to be a rather vague declaration of principles, some-
times backed up by more concrete political demands.
Nevertheless, all through its actions the anti-racist network has concen-
trated on formulating possible solutions to the causes of racism and right-
extremist electoral successes. In the aftermath of the 1991 elections, the
anti-racist demand was mainly one in favour of another way of doing
politics. A new political culture was proposed as a remedy to the growing
cleavage between politics and public opinion. Politics needed to be more
transparent and efficient, more human and more social. The anti-racist
coalition thus focused on a revision of both the structures of the political
system and the content of politics. Later on, the dominating paradigm was
one in which anti-racist action was linked to the need for a stronger social
policy in order to equilibrate socioeconomic imbalances in society.
This article has distinguished a major focus in the anti-racist discourse
on socioeconomic causes and individual expressions of racism. Equal rights
and equal chances, tolerance and solidarity became key notions in its
message. On the one hand, anti-racism was defined as the need for a
changing attitude and mentality. The population had to learn to ‘accept’ the
cultural others and these latter had to ‘integrate’. In this sense, the anti-
racist movement reproduced the dominant view that the challenge of a
multicultural society is a problem of culturally different groups that have to
learn and live together. On the other hand, the solution to racism was seen
in a policy in favour of equal rights and equal chances for all citizens on the
social, economic and political level. This supposed a redistribution of
economic welfare, a more balanced distribution of social goods and equal
access to education, jobs, housing and social security.
The claim for a more equal politics was formulated as a remedy to the
problems of exclusion. On the one hand, equal access to housing, education,
social security and politics were advanced as a main instrument to include
immigrants in society and remedy their marginal position. On the other
hand, a politics of equality was considered as a main instrument in the
struggle against racist feelings and attitudes in public opinion. In a vision
whereby poverty and racism seem to go together, fighting racism implies
developing measures to improve socioeconomic positions and to ensure
equality. Such explanations are quite comforting, as they allow for ‘under-
standing’ racist attitudes caused by ‘frustration’ and ‘manipulation’ and to
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offer some solutions to cure society from racism. The anti-racist movement
thus seemed to expect that a policy against poverty would remove the basis
on which racism grows. The discourse suggests that changing peoples’
concrete conditions would in the long run change their opinions and
attitudes and remove the grounds that lead to a right-extremist vote. As
such, the anti-racist movement has adopted the dominant definition of
racism and its causes. However, the correlation between poverty, intoler-
ance and racism seems all too simple. The dominant frame that stresses the
‘crisis-racism’ link is not answering the question as to why certain parts of
the population express their frustration by a right-extremist vote and why
they apparently see no other options to their feelings of insecurity and
powerlessness (Deslé, 1992). Moreover, there is no reason to believe that
racist ideas and opinions will really disappear, that people will no longer
vote for extremist parties or that diversity in society will suddenly become
unproblematic.
While anti-racist demands have remained fairly stable in terms of the
values and principles to be defended, the main issues formulated and the
rhetoric used in the platform texts has proved to be variable. A ‘new
political culture’ was the key term in the 1992 mobilization but disappeared
from the platform text two years later. In the run up to the 1994 elections,
‘equal rights’ dominated the discourse, as well as the concept of ‘solidarity’
and the objective to fight against all forms of racism and right-extremism.
In the third HiH demonstration, the demands were limited to a reaffirm-
ation of traditional anti-racist principles but affirmed that the ‘multicultural
society’ was a positive thing to deal with. Equal rights, democracy, and
solidarity were joined by a strong appeal for unity in society. Clearly, the
anti-racist discourses wanted to oppose the politics of division proposed by
right-extremist ideology. The anti-racist movement accepted multicultural-
ism as a fact and insisted that diversity in itself was not a problem. The real
challenge for society was framed as the quest to eliminate all forms of
inequality, intolerance and racism. During the last demonstration in 2002,
the dominant claims were phrased in terms of ‘equal chances’ in a multi-
cultural society and the anti-racist movement adopted a clear international
perspective to approach international immigration. In other words, the
anti-racist messages have shown themselves to be products of the actuality
of the time and of a dominant frame of thinking. Multiculturalism has been
affirmed with more conviction all through the 1990s, parallel to an official
political choice in favour of a multicultural society, and racism has been
named more explicitly as a danger to democracy than it was the case at the
start of HiH. The HiH movement also gradually adapted a more inter-
national perspective in order to talk about equality and solidarity. In the
most recent actions, classical anti-racist claims have been placed in a more




The policy objectives proposed and the political strategies to be
deployed have in general not been very detailed in the anti-racist platforms.
HiH only referred to major domains of action. The movement primarily
wanted to contribute to a climate in which anti-racism and anti-extremism
are part of the public consensus. The official manifests of the HiH network
thus remained rather general. This was without any doubt also a necessary
requirement to be able to quickly mobilize the support of a diversity of
associations and pressure groups on both sides of the country (Flemish and
francophone). The broad coalition explains the need for compromise and
for a discourse aimed at the largest common denominator in the anti-racist
struggle.
At the same time, there seems to be considerable confusion about what
should be understood as the ideology and politics of anti-racism. There is
no shared notion of what is meant by the concept of a multicultural society,
no clear vision on how to develop a political practice that articulates new
ways of recognizing cultural differences, or on the consequences of
developing new conceptions of democracy, tolerance and solidarity in a
globalizing world. Contrary to the ideology of right-extremism, which offers
precise answers to the question of how society should look and which values
need to be defended, the anti-racist message has remained vague and
fragmented. Anti-racism comprises no concrete and coherent worldview,
and offers no clear-cut vision of how to deal with inequality and diversity
in society.
This is in no way unique to the HiH coalition. Evidence shows that most
anti-racist movements operate in an ambivalent field: at one level they
appeal to universal values and defend anti-racism as the struggle for human
equality and social justice; at the other level, where they oppose discrimi-
nation and call for tolerance and solidarity in the multicultural society, they
are dealing with notions of difference and working within a particularistic
agenda (Lloyd, 2002: 69). Although the ideology of anti-racism is complex
and multifaceted, the HiH case seems to share some features with anti-
racist movements across Europe: anti-racists work with changing concep-
tions of discrimination and exclusion, attempt to represent racialized
minorities and develop solidarity actions. Underlying these themes is a
wider social project about social justice, equality and social cohesion
(Lloyd, 2002: 76). Moreover, in the broader framework of international
migration and globalization, many anti-racist mobilizations have broadened
their concerns to include the issue of asylum seekers and to think about the
broader application of anti-racist ideas.
Also, in the framework of explanations offered by the anti-racist organiz-
ations, there is commonly a clear lack of understanding about the specific
ways in which mainstream politics has prepared the grounds for racist
political programmes. What is the impact of a legal framework in which
the division between categories of citizens and non-citizens has been
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institutionalized? How to understand the consequences of a democratic
society that claims equality and at the same time legitimates a politics in
which some categories of people are attributed more rights than others?23
In order to develop effective counter-strategies to racism, an analysis that
addresses these thorny questions seems necessary. Also, a better under-
standing of the impact of the marginalized position of immigrants in society
on stereotypes within the dominant population is required if one wants to
overcome the problem of developing effective alternatives to racist
opinions.
In sum, the anti-racist discourse seems to be situated on one side of the
apparent dilemma of racism or democracy. The fact that anti-racism has
merely focused on explanations at an individual level, that it concentrated
on the more visible political expressions of racism, and positioned itself as
a counter-movement to right-extremist electoral successes, might indicate
why anti-racism has been locked up in a defensive discourse. As long as the
anti-racist movement is not taking into account why extreme-right answers
gain popularity, how to understand the impact of regular politics in insti-
tutionalizing and legitimating (cultural and ethnic) divisions in society, and
how anti-racism can formulate a positive social project, it seems very
unlikely that effective alternatives and practices will develop.24
As to the question of the possibilities of anti-racism as an ideology and
as a set of policy objectives, the efficiency of the activities and strategies
deployed by the anti-racist network have been proved relative. Although
the anti-racist network in Belgium has deployed a great dynamic and has
launched important signals to politics and public opinion, it has not been
able to really affect the general social and political climate and to enforce
its demands on the political agenda. The rise of intolerance, negative
feelings towards immigrants and racist expressions has not been blocked by
anti-racist sensitizing actions or mobilizations of public opinion. What is
more, the political translation of such feelings and attitudes by Vlaams Blok
has become more legitimate and acceptable throughout the 1990s . There
is, in other words, no such counter-weight to Vlaams Blok, which as a
popular opposition party, has managed to influence the political agenda and
determine the terms of the mainstream debate on foreigners within
Belgium. The presence of an efficient anti-racist watchdog is still to be
awaited and, contrary to the racist ideology, the anti-racist answers have not
been very precise and anti-racism has not yet found a particularly strong
political translation.
Notes
1 Studies on the role of anti-racist social movements, and the ideologies they
articulate, have led to a controversy about the relative failure of these
movements. Not only have ideas about anti-racism been criticized; the capacity
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of anti-racist organizations to mobilize mass support and to ensure the develop-
ment of effective public policies against racial discrimination has also been
questioned. Attempts to identify reasons for the ‘failure’ of anti-racism has
been commented by Lloyd, 1998; also Gilroy, 1992. For an overview of the
criticism on anti-racism, see Bonnett, 2000: 147–168.
2 In order to draw a complete picture of anti-racism in Belgium, it would be useful
to study other anti-racist organizations in their discourse and structures and to
look at the francophone anti-racist associations such as MRAX and Ligue des
Droits de L’homme. Also, the activities developed by the Centre For Equal
Opportunities and Opposition to Racism deserve attention. This centre was
founded in 1993 as a governmental organization, responsible for the application
of the Belgian law against racism of 1981. The centre studies complaints on
racism; it can start a judicial procedure when the law has been violated and is
entitled to advise the federal government on matters concerning immigration,
nationality acquisition, racial equality, etc. Some of its recommendations have
been translated into legislation. Moreover, the centre developed a programme
of information and education concerning immigration and racism for public
administration officers (Cornil, 1998). However, the focus of this contribution
does not permit us to go into these matters.
3 There is no equivalent to Vlaams Blok in Wallonia. The extreme-right parties
Front National and Agir are electorally insignificant and structurally weak.
Moreover, Wallonia stands officially closer to the French tradition. Conse-
quently, there has been a stronger political tendency to avoid racializing the
population and recognizing the presence of immigrant communities as ‘ethnic
groups’. This is not to imply that racism is not present in the southern part of
the country. However, for historical and political-philosophical reasons,
extreme-right political formations have not been able to mobilize and organize
racist currents in Wallonia.
4 A vote for Vlaams Blok has initially been explained mainly as a ‘protest’ vote,
which has to be seen, not as a choice in favour of the extreme right-wing party
and its programme, but as a choice against all the other political parties. A
rejection of ‘politics as usual’ by parts of the electorate and the so-called ‘crisis’
of the traditional political system is a central element in this explanation. In its
campaigning, Vlaams Blok has often profiled itself as an ‘anti-system’ party,
which has reinforced this explanation. However, motives to vote for the party
have appeared to be more complex. Although feelings of political apathy and
powerlessness influence the electoral decision in favour of Vlaams Blok, De
Witte (1992) has shown that such a choice is not only a protest vote, but appears
to be stimulated by the anti-immigrant and nationalist programme.
5 Doom (1992) warns not to restrict reality to the problem definition that has
been advanced by right-extremism. Moreover, whether socioeconomic depri-
vation and the presence of immigrants in society are the triggering factors to
racism is still to be confirmed. The anti-immigrant votes for Vlaams Blok
appear by now not to be limited to defavorized groups in society and urban
areas where problems of ‘living together’ might occur (Billiet and De Witte,
2001).
6 Growing diversity and globalization have put pressure on the established
structures of society. These developments reveal the tension that exists between
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the conception of a homogeneous national community as a normative ground
for social solidarity in the welfare state and the heterogeneous social reality.
Though the discussion has not yet penetrated public discourse, the presence of
immigrants in society requires us to critically redefine the basic concepts of
social and political life (Favell, 1997; Wimmer, 1997).
7 Charta 91 was initiated as a movement of progressive intellectuals, trying to
develop an ideological front with democratic political forces against the
extreme right-wing party. Charta 91 is mainly a think tank that reflects on
racism and right-extremism from a broad perspective concerned with the func-
tioning of democracy. Objectief 479.917, politically the most radical initiative,
is an association basically claiming voting rights for foreigners and proposing
the automatic attribution of Belgian nationality to anyone residing legally in the
country for more than five years. Objectief developed out of a large petition
action that wanted to present a symbolic counter-weight against extremism by
collecting as many (and more!) signatures against extremism as Vlaams Blok
had obtained votes.
8 The following analysis is mainly based on published manifests and internal
documents found in the VAKA-archive in Antwerp.
9 In the run up to the 1994 demonstration and with the European and local
elections in perspective, the HiH network acted together with Charta 91, in
favour of a political strategy isolating Vlaams Blok. The idea of a ‘Cordon
sanitaire’ is much contested – not in the least by the extreme right party itself
– and is based on the agreement of democratic politicians not to collaborate
with Vlaams Blok and not to sign political deals with this party. By doing so,
the extremist party is prevented from governing power. It cannot take responsi-
bilities and will not be in a position to effectuate its programme or parts of it.
One of the key arguments of the anti-racist movement is that a democratic
regime has the duty to protect itself from an assault by anti-democratic forces.
10 In the political context of the Cold War, the former peace movement VAKA-
OCV had a tradition of bringing together old and new social movements to
mobilize against cruise missiles. The movement recycled itself in the 1990s into
an anti-racist movement. It became the logistic and administrative heart of the
HiH coalition. The coalition was built upon more formal organizations that are
active in diverse segments of civil society. The main partner organizations of
the network are the socialist trade union ABVV and the Christian Workers
Movement ACW/ACV. Other partners were the Third- and Fourth-World
movement with organizations such as the Nationaal Centrum voor Ontwikke-
lingssamenwerking (NCOS), Broederlijk Delen, Artsen zonder Grenzen; the
ecology movement represented by Bond Beter Leefmilieu, the women’s
movement (Vrouwenoverlegkomitee), organizations of seniors and the youth
movement organized in the Katholieke Jeugdraad. The integration sector and
the voice of ethnic minorities were represented by VCIM (later by the Vlaams
Minderheden Centrum – VMC). An official body thus channelled the partici-
pation of the immigrant minorities. The question of representation by VCIM
would become much disputed by the grassroots associations of immigrants that
developed throughout the 1990s. These were not directly involved in the HiH-
network – but some of these associations have signed the platform texts and
mobilized their basis for the demonstrations.
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11 The press coverage of the event is significant in this regard: comments pointed
to the massive presence of ordinary citizens, to the great numbers of young
people, the participation of immigrants, the involvement of a plurality of associ-
ations and the remarkable coalition of old and new social movements. The
demonstration proved that ‘The country of Hand in Hand’ had become a reality
(press articles in the VAKA-archive).
12 The HiH-network is mainly a Flemish movement, and the mass demonstrations
mobilized primarily in Flanders, but the network has always tried to cooperate
with francophone associations and anti-racist movements. Although the
political relevance of racism is mainly situated in Flanders, the anti-racist
network underlined that anti-racism is a concern of the whole country, Flemish
and francophones. The national character of the demonstrations has been
brought to the fore in the public statements of the network.
13 The necessity to develop a multilevel strategy against the cultural, structural
and political expressions of racism has been underlined by De Witte et al.
(1996).
14 In its communication strategy, Vlaams Blok seems to apply the tactic of ‘two
faces’, one for external use towards a mass public, and another real (and
extreme) one towards its militants. Consequently, the Vlaams Blok voters
would in large part have been trapped and misled by a party that uses a populist
strategy to attract the public and (wrongly) points to foreigners and migrants
as scapegoats for all that goes wrong in society. The anti-racist discourse refers
to this where it includes the warning that ‘blaming the victim’ might in the long
run turn against (parts) of their ‘own’ population that the right-extremist party
pretends to defend. This fits into the strategy of the anti-racist movement to
reveal the ‘true’ face of right-extremism (Spruyt, 1994).
15 There has been a fierce debate on the failure of the integration policy in 2002,
initiated by intellectuals and political actors rooted in the migrant communities.
One of the more controversial spokespersons in this debate was Dyab Abou
Jahjah, the leader of the Arab-European League (AEL). The AEL is a political
movement that tries to mobilize the immigrant communities around a message
of ‘ethnic’ pride and Muslim identity.
16 A broad range of issues related to anti-racism and to reflections about the multi-
cultural society have instigated heated discussions between democratic (and
self-declared anti-racist) political actors (the debates on immigration policy,
asylum, nationality, integration, language acquisition, etc.). How to interpret
equal rights and citizenship has been a major point of divergence. In these
discussions, the use of racist and anti-racist arguments is often intermingled.
This point has been illustrated by Jacobs in a study of the arguments used in
the political debate on voting rights for non-European immigrants (Jacobs,
1998).
17 This time, the Belgian movement was part of a more global dynamic in terms
of anti-racist action. The Belgian mass mobilization was an exponent of a
European action that was undertaken in several European member states out
of concern for the electoral success of extreme right parties. All over Europe
(Bologna, Den Haag, Frankfurt, Helsinki, Lausanne, London, Luxemburg,
Madrid, Stockholm and Vienna) people marched for a Europe of human rights,
solidarity and tolerance.
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18 The issue of granting political rights to non-nationals has a long history. Though
this question dates from the 1960s and has been much debated, especially in the
period 1982–98, the principle that voting rights should be linked to Belgian
nationality remained fixed. Only in 1998, under pressure of the Maastricth
Treaty, has the link between nationality and political rights been blurred
(Alaluf, 1997; Hubeau and Foblets, 1997; Jacobs, 1998). It took until 18
November 2003 for non-European citizens to be granted the right to vote in
local elections. This, however, does not include the right to be eligible.
19 Until 1995 the Christian labour movement and socialist labour movement,
third-world movements, youth movements, the peace movement operated
loosely together under the label HiH in a network without formal structures.
In 1995, the network opted for a more permanent anti-racist movement and
HiH became a formal association, VAKA-Hand in Hand, which brought
more clarity in terms of decision-making power, more autonomy in defining
the political points of view, the campaigns and actions, the financial resources.
The focus remained, however, on anti-racist actions aimed at mobilizing a
mass public.
20 Since the 1970s, all workers in Belgium have the right to vote and to be elected
without any distinction based on nationality or origin (Vranken, 1990).
21 One feared that the vote of European citizens would be a vote for francophone
lists. This could disturb the existing power relations between Flemish and
francophones in Brussels. In the officially bilingual region of Brussels, the
Flemish are a minority and the political representation of the Flemish
community is a sensitive issue.
22 This makes up 9 percent of the total population in the country. Half of them
have a non-European nationality.
23 N. Räthzel goes into these questions, debating how German constructions of
the nation have turned certain groups into foreigners. The French debate on
‘citoyenneté’ and ‘droit à la différence’ described by Lloyd touches upon the
same issue (Lloyd, 2002; Räthzel, 2002).
24 Wieviorka (1998) has commented on the defensive model of anti-racism in
France, and similar remarks have been formulated in Bonnett (2000) and in
Gilroy’s critique about the failure of anti-racism in Britain (1992).
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